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¶1 Hurricane Katrina dramatically changed the lives of more than one million 
Americans, evoking passion and tension around the nation.  Katrina’s devastating impact 
has left hundreds of thousands of Americans without adequate shelter and without a 
guaranteed prospect for shelter.1  Rebuilding New Orleans will take years, and a pressing 
question is for whom the city will be rebuilt.  New Orleans flooded because the federal 
and municipal government failed to fulfill their promise to build and maintain a viable 
levee system.2  Currently, the city is facing extreme racial tension and could be facing a 
major racial and economic transformation.3  The city may shrink its city limits or 
footprint, effectively excluding former residents.4  This Comment will establish that any 
reduction of the city’s footprint that has a disproportionate impact on African-American 
residents will violate the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).5 
¶2 The stated goal and hope of the rebuilding effort is to rebuild New Orleans for all 
interested residents.6  This Comment will address an alternative scenario—a plan for 
New Orleans that excludes vast numbers of African-American residents who want to 
return, dramatically altering the city’s racial makeup.  All of the residents relied on the 
government to protect them from flooding; it is unfair to subject only African-American 
residents to relocation after the government failed to keep its promise.  The FHA can 
protect African-American residents from public officials and private developers whose 
decisions have a disparate impact on the African-American community.  African-
American residents who would be displaced through rebuilding can ask a federal court, 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy staff, Professor Len Rubinowitz, 
and my lovely wife, Jessa DeSimone. 
1 See generally A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans: J. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Transp. & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Public Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt., Subcomm. on 
Water Resources and Env’t., 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/02oct20061230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
25915.pdf [hereinafter A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans]. 
2 John Warrick & Peter Whoriskey, Army Corps is Faulted on New Orleans Levees, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 
2006, at A6. 
3 Ann M. Simmons, Racial Current Runs Through This Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A4. 
4 Gordon Russell, Officials Tiptoe Around Footprint Issue, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 8, 2006, 
at 1. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). 
6 President George W. Bush, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address from the City of New 
Orleans Shortly After Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/katrina/archive.html. 
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either under a declaratory judgment act or after plans have been released, to order that the 
rebuilding plan not violate the anti-discrimination principals of the FHA. 
¶3 Former residents who lost their homes must have the means to secure the housing 
that they both need and deserve.  This Comment will begin with an overview of the city 
of New Orleans before the hurricane, and will then briefly touch on Hurricane Katrina’s 
impact on the city.  Next, it will examine the statutory rights vested in the FHA.  This 
Comment will then analyze FHA jurisprudence in multiple jurisdictions, examining 
theories behind past FHA claims, the legal standards established in those cases, how 
plaintiffs were able to satisfy FHA standards, and the types of remedies historically 
provided by the legal system.  After such legal and historical examination, this Comment 
will synthesize past case law with the unique facts at hand and propose a provocative 
remedy. 
II. OVERVIEW OF NEW ORLEANS BEFORE HURRICANE KATRINA 
A. Population 
¶4 New Orleans is a city with a distinct racial makeup.  The New Orleans metropolitan 
area consists of seven parishes and has a total population of just over 1.3 million people, 
making it the fifty-fourth largest metropolitan area in the country.7  The 2000 Census, the 
last census prior to Hurricane Katrina, reported that the city of New Orleans had 485,000 
residents, and was the thirty-first largest city in the country.8  The city’s population 
consisted of 325,927 African-Americans (sixty-seven percent) and 135,956 whites 
(twenty-eight percent).9  There were 113,136 African-American households with forty-
three percent of African-Americans owning their homes.10 
¶5 The media coverage of the evacuation of New Orleans has reintroduced our country 
to racial segregation.  The coverage after Katrina showed a city with deep racial 
divisions.  However, the segregation in the city was not the result of hundreds of years of 
discrimination but was actually a more recent occurrence.11  New Orleans has always had 
a high percentage of African-Americans, but until recently racial groups were not isolated 
by geographic boundaries.12  The city’s transformation took place over the past fifty 
years.13  By 2000, the average African-American resident in New Orleans lived in a 
neighborhood in which eighty-two percent of the population was African-American (a 
proportion that is considered “highly segregated”).14 
                                                 
7 The seven parishes are Orleans (City of New Orleans), Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, 
St. John the Baptist, and St. Tammy; U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000, Summary File 1 (SF 1). 
8 THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE 
PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2005), available at 
http://media.brookings.edu/mediaarchive/pubs/metro/pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf (citing U.S. Census 
Bureau, Census 2000) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM]. 
9 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, SF 1 and Summary File 3 (SF 3) (2000). 
10 THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, KEY INDICATORS OF ENTRENCHED POVERTY (2005), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050920_povertynumbers.pdf [hereinafter KEY 
INDICATORS]. 
11 NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
12 Id. at 5 (citing PEIRCE LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN LANDSCAPE (1976)). 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Id. at 6. 
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¶6 Paralleling this segregation was the clustering of those living in poverty.  Forty-
three percent of poor African-Americans lived in areas of concentrated poverty, while 
only eleven percent of poor whites lived in such areas.15  The most striking example of 
this concentrated poverty is the Lower Ninth Ward, where there was a thirty-six percent 
poverty rate and high incidences of crime and violence.16  Public housing data shows that 
in 2005 there were 17,913 publicly subsidized housing units, all occupied by African-
Americans.17  White flight in the form of urban sprawl, without the justification of high 
population density in existing developed land, presents one theory as to why race has 
become more concentrated.18 
B. Economy 
¶7 New Orleans has long struggled with economic depression, but it has the economic 
potential and vitality to draw workers, investors and industry back to the city.  The 
cultural uniqueness of the city makes it a tourist destination.  Also, the Port of New 
Orleans is the largest “through put” port in the United States,19 handling more than 430 
million tons of cargo annually.20  The area produces thirty percent of the crude oil and 
twenty percent of the natural gas produced in the United States.21  Additionally, forty 
billion barrels of oil reserves were recently discovered in the Gulf of Mexico.22  The 
coastal wetlands create a nursery for much of the nation’s seafood, with more than forty-
five percent of the nation’s shrimp and thirty-five percent of the nation’s oysters being 
caught in the area.23 
¶8 Despite these economic opportunities, the city’s metropolitan area has an eighteen 
percent poverty rate, making it the sixth poorest out of the hundred largest metropolitan 
areas in 2000.24  In 2000, the median household income was $35,317—the fourth lowest 
out of the hundred largest metropolitan areas in the United States.25  Job growth in the 
New Orleans metropolitan area has lagged behind national trends.26  Non-farm 
employment in New Orleans increased by fifty-four percent from 1970 to 2000, while the 
national growth rate over the same period was eighty-seven percent.27  Economic growth 
                                                 
15 ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, KATRINA’S WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS 
AMERICA 10 (The Brookings Institution 2005), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_Concentratedpoverty.pdf.  
16 Gwen Filosam, ‘I Came to See What God Had Done,’ NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2005, at 
A1. 
17 KEY INDICATORS, supra note 10.  
18 NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 10. 
19 A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 68. 
20 Press Release, The Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and The Subcommittee on 
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management to Hold Joint Hearing on  
A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans (on file with author) [hereinafter Vision and Strategy 
Press Release]. 
21 Id. at 56. 
22 Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20. 
23 Id. 
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opportunities exist in a number of industries, but New Orleans must be adequately rebuilt 
before tourism or other industries return.28 
III. HURRICANE KATRINA 
¶9 While Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans on many levels, it also offers an 
opportunity to rebuild a city that had slipped into patterns of racial segregation and 
economic depression.  In President Bush’s speech to the nation after the hurricane, he 
stated that in New Orleans and surrounding parishes, it is no longer safe to live in more 
than a quarter million houses.  This leaves hundreds of thousands of people who need to 
find longer-term housing.29 
¶10 A U.S. Representative from the affected region estimated that 228,000 occupied 
housing units had been flooded—more than forty-five percent of all usable housing.30  A 
flooded structure can often be rehabilitated, but extensive damage to the foundation or 
support structure requires demolition.31  The storm damaged the city’s most vulnerable 
areas, with thirty-eight of New Orleans’s forty-nine extreme poverty census tracts 
flooded.32  It could cost up to $61.5 billion to address the environmental impact of 
Katrina, with thirty-five billion dollars needed to restore the wastewater treatment 
infrastructure and nearly twenty-five billion dollars needed to assess and dispose of 
hazardous wastes.33 
¶11 Mtumishi St. Julien, Executive Director of the Finance Authority of New Orleans, 
stated that as of October 18, 2005, 40,000 people were still in shelters, another 150,000 
were in hotels, and an additional 150,000 or more were staying with relatives.34  “The 
city is virtually empty,” he said.35  The massive scale of the destruction in addition to the 
emptiness of the city will allow for city planners to focus on rebuilding a city that can 
withstand another Katrina, but could also lead to the exclusion of many of the city’s 
former residents. 
IV. REBUILDING 
¶12 The government has responded to Katrina at the federal, state and local levels.  On 
October 18, 2005, the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and the 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency 
Management held a joint hearing on “A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New 
Orleans.”36  The Subcommittees made clear that “to be effective, New Orleans and its 
                                                 
28 A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
29 President George W. Bush, supra note 6. 
30 A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 11-12 (statement of Rep. William J. 
Jefferson).  The 228,000 total includes 120,000 owner-occupied units and 108,000 units occupied by 
renters. 
31 Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20. 
32 Id.  The U.S. census bureau defines census tracts as small, homogenous, relatively permanent statistical 
subdivisions of a county averaging about 4,000 inhabitants. 
3336 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1889, 1916 (2005).  
34 A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 199 (statement of Mtumishi St. 
Julien, Executive Director, The Finance Authority of New Orleans). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at I. 
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citizenry will have to create a comprehensive plan for the rebuilding effort, including 
clear long-term goals, public participation and measurable outcomes.”37  New Orleans 
Mayor C. Ray Nagin announced the formation of the “Bring New Orleans Back 
Commission” on September 30, 2005, the same day the New Orleans City Council said it 
would form its own advisory commission.38  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco also 
created a twenty-four member commission, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, which 
will focus on the rebuilding of South Louisiana.39  Although legislative and 
administrative bodies have been formed, there are pressing questions about the 
government’s role, as well as the need for a concrete rebuilding plan. 
A. Government’s Role after Prior Disasters 
¶13 The government will have an active role in the rebuilding process.  The 1906 fire in 
San Francisco, California and the 1900 hurricane in Galveston, Texas, provide two of the 
more recent examples of the necessary partnership between government and the private 
sector when an entire community is destroyed.40  In each case, government money made 
up only a portion of the total expenses, while most of the rebuilding was done by private 
individuals.41  The government played a major role in ensuring public safety by taking 
decisive and tangible steps that provided an essential public reassurance to traumatized 
citizens and focused on creating a level playing field.42  However, in response to a more 
recent natural disaster, the government did not provide adequate, integrated housing.43  
The government’s response to Hurricane Charley has failed to provide adequate relief or 
opportunity for the most vulnerable among those affected, leaving many of the 
hurricane’s victims in a government-run trailer park filled with drugs and crime and far 
from opportunity.44 
B. Public Planning 
¶14 A number of legislative proposals and reports have been floated as possibilities for 
rebuilding the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, and a few of those options are 
summarized below. 
¶15 The states affected––Mississippi, New Orleans, and Alabama––will rely on the 
federal government to provide revenue, and large federal aid packages have already been 
passed.45  In December 2005, Congress passed a $29 billion aid package for the Gulf 
region.46  The package gave Mississippi about five times as much per household in 
housing aid as it gave Louisiana––a testimony to the clout of Governor Haley Barbour of 
Mississippi, a former Republican National Committee chairman, and Mississippi Senator 
                                                 
37 Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20 
38 Gary Rivlin, Divisions Appear with Storm Recovery Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at A29.  
39 Id. 
40 Anna Bernasek, Blueprints from Cities that Rose from Their Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at C3. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Peter Wilkinson, Welcome to Nowhere Pop. 1,062, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 58. 
44 Id. 
45 Adam Nossiter, A Big Government Fix-It Plan for New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at A1. 
46 Id. 
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Thad Cochran, chairman of the Appropriations Committee.47  All of the affected states 
are currently lobbying the federal government for more funds.  The “Bring New Orleans 
Back Commission” is playing a large part in the rebuilding effort and recently released a 
master urban plan to rebuild New Orleans.48 
¶16 Representative Richard H. Baker, a Republican from suburban Baton Rouge, is 
advocating for a housing recovery plan that would make the federal government the 
biggest landowner in New Orleans.49  Representative Baker’s proposed Louisiana 
Recovery Corporation would spend as much as eighty billion dollars to pay off lenders, 
restore public works, buy large ruined chunks of the city, clean them up and then sell 
them back to developers.50  Under the plan, the Louisiana Recovery Corporation would 
prevent citizens from defaulting on their mortgage payments by offering to purchase 
homeowners’ homes, at no less than sixty percent of the equity they held in the property 
before Hurricane Katrina.51  Property owners would not be required to sell their land, but 
such a sale would come with the option to purchase the property back from the 
corporation after the rehabilitation.52  The federal corporation would have nothing to do 
with the redevelopment of the land, with the plans being drawn up by local authorities 
and private developers.53 
¶17 Another plan relies on the pre-storm market value of homes.  The plan would offer 
owners of flood-damaged houses a choice between a government buyout at full, pre-
storm market value, or a renovation grant to cover most repairs.54  If the administrators of 
the plan classify a house as “severely flooded”—meaning that the home took on roughly 
two feet of water or more—then the home owner would be eligible for a buyout at full 
pre-Katrina market value, minus any monies previously received in insurance.55  When it 
comes to renovation grants, the government will distinguish between homeowners with 
flood insurance, and those without.  Homeowners with flood insurance could receive a 
grant of up to eighty percent of the difference between their renovation costs and any 
insurance coverage, while homeowners without flood insurance—regardless of whether 
the homeowner lived in flood zone— could only receive, at most, a renovation grant that 
would cover sixty percent of the costs.56 
¶18 Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s main housing assistance bill would create 
the Louisiana Housing and Land Trust Corporation, “which would use billions of 
available federal dollars to provide home buyouts, loans and grants in devastated 
parishes.”57  The bill is designed to “help homeowners rebuild and recover from the 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 See BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK COMMISSION URBAN PLANNING COMMITTEE, ACTION PLAN FOR NEW 
ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY (2006), available at 
http://www.bringneworleansback.com/Portals/BringNewOrleansBack/Resources/Urban%20Planning%20A
ction%20Plan%20Final%20Report.pdf. 





54 Gordon Russell, Frank Donzo & Laura Maggi, Buyout in Works, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 
13, 2006, at A1. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Melinda Deslatte, Blanco, Lawmakers Scramble to Wrap Up Work by Friday Session End, ASSOCIATED 
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hurricanes and would minimize blighted neighborhoods and large tracts of abandoned, 
ruined housing.”58  Most importantly, the federal government, speaking through Donald 
Powell, President Bush’s chief federal hurricane recovery adviser, indicated that it is 
“important that there be some ‘vehicle’ to spend the federal housing aid coming to 
Louisiana.”59 
¶19 Loren C. Scott, an emeritus economist at Louisiana State University, stated that 
Representative Baker’s plan is “probably one of the few last best hopes out there for 
people whose homes were flooded, and had no flood insurance.”60  Professor Scott went 
on to say that “[w]ithout this kind of help, there’s a very large number of people who are 
just sunk.”61  The same can be said for the local buyout plan, since it mirrors 
Representative Baker’s plan in many ways. 
¶20 Any rebuilding plan should be inspected for blatant and intentional efforts to 
exclude racial minorities as well as certain facially neutral techniques that may have 
substantial discriminatory effects.62  Louisiana State University Professor Craig Colten 
concluded that the previous design of New Orleans placed racial minorities in locations 
where flooding would have a greater impact.63 
C. Political Landscape 
¶21 Public officials have painted the rebuilding effort as an opportunity to combat the 
social ills found in New Orleans.64  Addressing the public from in front of the historic St. 
Louis Cathedral, President Bush stated: 
When communities are rebuilt, they must be even better and stronger than 
before the storm. . . . As all of us saw on television, there is also some 
deep, persistent poverty in this region, as well.  That poverty has roots in a 
history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the 
opportunity of America.  We have a duty to confront this poverty with 
bold action.  So let us restore all that we have cherished from yesterday, 
and let us rise above the legacy of inequality.65
¶22 President Bush offered a pledge that the area hit by the hurricane will have the 
support of the federal government for “as long as it takes, to help citizens rebuild their 
communities and their lives.”66  Furthermore, he stated that although there are important 
                                                                                                                                                 
PRESS, Feb. 17, 2006. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Nossiter, supra note 45, at A1. 
61 Id. 
62 See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1081-82 (5th ed. 2002) (explaining that 
discriminatory effects can manifest as controls on minimum housing cost, minimum housing size, and 
minimum lot size; related techniques including prohibitions on mobile homes and multifamily houses). 
63 See CRAIG E. COLTEN, AN UNNATURAL METROPOLIS: WRESTING NEW ORLEANS FROM NATURE 77 
(Louisiana State University Press 2005) (“With greater means and power, the white population occupied 
the better-drained sections of the city, while blacks typically inhabited the swampy ‘rear’ districts.”). 
64 See generally President George W. Bush, supra note 6; A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New 
Orleans, supra note 1. 
65 President George W. Bush, supra note 6. 
66 Id. 
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decisions and many details to resolve, some “clear principles” have been established.67 
President Bush promised that the federal government will be “fully engaged in the 
mission,” but that “Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other state and local leaders will 
have the primary role” in planning the rebuilding.68 
¶23 Some local officials have taken notice of the need to assure protection against 
rebuilding plans that would have a discriminatory effect.  At a “Bring New Orleans 
Back” Commission meeting, Commissioner Oliver Thomas asked his fellow 
commissioners to commit formally to rebuilding the Ninth Ward—an impoverished, 
largely African-American and heavily damaged area.69  Commissioner Thomas's 
resolution passed unanimously without debate, with one abstention.70  However, the vote 
prompted both black and white commissioners to assess the wisdom of making 
commitments before they have had a chance to discuss an issue and its alternatives.71 
¶24 Rebuilding and repopulating New Orleans becomes more urgent when one 
considers that other communities will be unwilling or unable to permanently accept an 
influx of displaced New Orleans residents.  The Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, 
explained that there are currently no recognizable long-term housing solutions in his 
state.72  Governor Perry stated that Texas is incapable of supporting evacuees without a 
considerable increase in federal aid.73  At the Congressional Subcommittee hearing, 
Mayor Nagin stated that New Orleans can get back up to 300,000 or 350,000 people with 
the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but beyond that, the 
city will need major housing loans and other help.74  President Bush urged that 
communities move decisively to change zoning laws and building codes, in order to 
avoid a repeat of the disaster when the city is rebuilt.75  However, in his speech he 
referenced “clear principles” that will guide the rebuilding effort,76 and one of those 
principles must be rebuilding without discriminating against the African-American 
community of New Orleans. 
V. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
A. Goals & Purposes 
¶25 The Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly know as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 
staked out a beachhead against discrimination and segregation in housing.77  Residents of 
New Orleans will find shelter under the umbrella of the FHA if the federal, state or local 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Rivlin, supra note 38. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Eric Lipton, Hurricane Evacuees Face Eviction Threats at Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2005, at A20 (“Our communities cannot be expected to support such a large evacuee population on 
a long-term basis without substantial federal aid.”). 
73 Id. 
74 Edward Epstein, Congress’ Role After Storm Debated, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2005, at A6. 
75 President George W. Bush, supra note 6. 
76 Id. 
77 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000). 
 112
Vol. 2:1] Rob Wilcox 
governments attempt to rebuild New Orleans in a way that has a discriminatory impact on 
African-Americans. 
¶26 The language and interpretations of the Act provide bite to the grand principal that 
“[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair 
housing throughout the United States.”78  The key section prohibits discrimination 
“against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, 
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”79 
¶27 The Supreme Court of the United States has not explicitly interpreted the breadth, 
depth and scope of the FHA, but has, at times, discussed its purposes and goals.  One 
important decision, Trafficante v. Metro Life Insurance Co., did not interpret the 
substance of the Act, but did state that the FHA is governed by broad and inclusive 
purposes.80  The Court identified the “benefits from interracial association,” and did not 
limit standing to only those at whom discrimination is aimed.81  The Court held that the 
FHA protects individuals if discrimination affects their daily lives.82  The Court ended its 
discussion with the hope that the FHA will “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.’”83  Lower courts have relied on statements that fair housing is 
“more important than jobs, and even more important than equal protection under the 
law,” as well as the lofty instruction that “we must turn our face away from a course of 
segregation and separation.”84 
¶28 While the FHA has panoply of features, Section B will explore how the FHA has 
specifically been used when governments have made decisions that have a discriminatory 
racial impact. 
B. Disparate Impact Claims 
¶29 The Federal Circuits agree that a successful FHA claim can be made by showing 
that a government decision has or will have a discriminatory impact on a protected 
class.85  The judiciary will act to remedy a flawed housing situation or program after the 
plaintiff or class is able to show that the decision has a substantial discriminatory 
impact.86  FHA claims can be brought against government or private actors and a court’s 
analysis differs depending on who the defendant is.87  Residents and evacuees of New 
Orleans will be able to bring suit against the federal government, the government of New 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 409 U.S. 205, 209-14 (1972). 
81 Id. at 211 (noting that “[t]he person on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim” of discrimination, 
the Court was referring to the statement of FHA supporter Senator Javits, who emphasized that 
discrimination harms the “whole community”). 
82 Id. (quoting Shannon v. U. S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970)). 
83 Id. (quoting Senator Walter Mondale, 114 CONG. REC. 2706, 3422 (1968)). 
84 NAACP v. Sec. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Senator Javits’s and 
Representative McCormack’s statements made during Congressional debates over the FHA, 114 CONG. 
REC. 2275, 2703 & 9616). 
85 Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986) (and cases cited therein). 
86 Id. 
87 Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact:  Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and 
Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 435-43 (1998). 
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Orleans, or the private developers contracted to rebuild the city.88  However, this 
Comment focuses entirely on a potential plaintiff’s remedies in the face of a 
governmental decision that has a disparate impact. 
¶30 Before analyzing the different circuits’ handling of FHA cases, it is important to 
distinguish an FHA analysis from an equal protection analysis.  The equal protection 
“impact plus” standard developed in Arlington Heights I,89 which requires a showing of 
discriminatory intent, is not the proper test for an FHA claim, which only requires a 
showing of a discriminatory effect.90  After the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
equal protection claim in Arlington Heights I, the Seventh Circuit on remand decided 
Arlington Heights II, where it found a valid cause of action under the FHA.91 
¶31 FHA jurisprudence has never dealt with such a large housing program; most claims 
focus on a single building, a discrete housing project or a specific zoning decision.  This 
section will synthesize a number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals’ FHA decisions to 
demonstrate that a claim brought against the entire New Orleans rebuilding effort fits 
within the scope of the FHA.  By examining a number of FHA cases, it becomes clear 
that although the FHA has never been applied to a citywide project or decision, the 
collection of FHA actions adds up to a metropolis worth of action.  This section will 
initially look to the Fifth Circuit, a New Orleans resident’s appropriate forum, before 
examining cases that have come from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits. 
1. The FHA in the Fifth Circuit 
¶32 The Fifth Circuit is the appropriate forum for a New Orleans resident to bring an 
FHA claim.  Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit has not decided many cases under the FHA, 
so it lacks the full and vibrant jurisprudence necessary to guide a complex analysis.92  
The available case law indicates, however, that the Fifth Circuit is generally in agreement 
with other Circuits on the basics––an FHA plaintiff need only show a discriminatory 
effect to be successful. 
¶33 A 1986 case, Hanson v. Veterans Administration, stands for the principle that a 
violation of the FHA would be established not only by proof of discriminatory intent, but 
through the showing of a significant discriminatory effect on a protected class.93  The 
Hanson Court’s brief analysis of the FHA cited a Sixth Circuit case, Arthur v. City of 
Toledo, with an affirmative nod towards the cases cited by that court in support of the 
discriminatory effect test.94  In Hanson, the court reviewed statistical studies produced by 
the plaintiffs and concluded that the district court’s decision was not clearly erroneous in 
                                                 
88 See generally id. 
89 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S. 252, 266-67 
(1977). 
90 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
91 Id. 
92 But see Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 
800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); Woods-Drake v. C.L. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982). 
93 800 F.2d at 1386. 
94 Id. at 1386 (relying on Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986) (and cases cited 
therein)). 
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finding plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to establish discriminatory effect.95  Although the 
plaintiffs in Hanson did not present enough evidence to meet their burden, the court 
stated that statistical evidence alone, if convincing, is sufficient to meet the burden 
imposed under the FHA.96  The Fifth Circuit’s case law does not indicate that the FHA 
contemplates a claim against an entire city’s building plan; the following analysis, 
however, will demonstrate that decisions from other circuits point to this conclusion. 
2. The FHA Four Factor Analysis: Arlington Heights II 
¶34 A landmark case in FHA jurisprudence occurred on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court.97  In Arlington Heights II, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s 
equal protection claim, while holding there was a valid FHA claim, differentiating the 
two causes of action.98  The court established four analytical factors that measure whether 
the FHA has been violated.99  The Seventh Circuit examined: (1) the strength of the 
plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect, (2) whether there was any evidence of 
discriminatory intent, (3) the government’s interest in taking the action complained of, 
and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel affirmative action or just to restrain the 
defendant from interfering with market forces.100  Although discriminatory intent was a 
factor, the court held that it was the least important of the four, and is inversely related to 
the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect.101 
¶35 The Seventh Circuit stated that a discriminatory effect inquiry asks two separate 
questions––first, whether the government’s decision has had a greater adverse impact on 
one racial group over another, and second, what effect the government’s decision has had 
on the required community interest of integration.102  The Seventh Circuit addressed the 
second question as completely independent from the first.103  The district court approved 
a decision made by the Village of Arlington Heights to deny a rezoning request since it 
was based on a desire to protect property values and maintain the prevailing zoning 
plan.104  The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that even without a showing of 
discriminatory intent, the ultimate effect of the rezoning denial could be racially 
discriminatory.105 
¶36 Municipalities acting within their scope of authority are given more deference than 
private citizens, but are not allowed to systematically deprive minorities of housing 
opportunities simply by using a racially neutral ordinance or instrument.106  District 
courts located in the Seventh Circuit are instructed to use a “statistical, effect-oriented 
                                                 
95 Id. at 1388-90. 
96 Id. at 1390. 
97 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
98 Id. at 1290. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1292. 
102 Id. 1290. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 1286. 
105 Id. at 1290. 
106 Id. at 1293. 
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view of causality” when determining the effects of a housing decision.107  A 
governmental entity is liable if the plaintiff can prove that the foreseeable consequences 
of a government act or omission adversely affects a protected class and if the action 
perpetuates racial segregation.108 
¶37 The Seventh Circuit established a useful four-factor analysis and clarified the 
distinction between an equal protection and FHA analysis.109  Furthermore, the court 
allowed the omission of an act, in this case the refusal to rezone a tract of land, as 
grounds for an FHA claim.110 
3. Refusing to Change Zoning Laws 
¶38 The Eighth Circuit decided an early FHA case, and the principles it espoused have 
become a guiding force in FHA jurisprudence.111  The Eighth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff was only required to prove that the government’s conduct “actually or 
predictably results in racial discrimination.”112  The United States brought an action under 
the FHA to challenge a City of Black Jack zoning ordinance preventing new construction 
of multifamily homes.113  The case focused on a municipal zoning ordinance and the 
effect the ordinance would have on African-Americans.114  The district court found for 
the City of Black Jack, holding that the ordinance had no greater effect on African-
Americans than whites.  The court specifically found that the proposed housing 
development––meant for families earning between $5,000 and $10,000––was designed to 
meet the needs of thirty-two percent of the African-American population and twenty-nine 
percent of the white population.115 
¶39 The Court of Appeals found this decision to be in error because the lower court 
failed to account for either the “ultimate effect” or the “historical context” of the city’s 
action.116  The Court of Appeals examined the housing statistics throughout the 
metropolitan area even though the case only considered a discrete ordinance.117  In doing 
so, the Court of Appeals found that the ordinance affected eighty-five percent of African-
Americans living in the metropolitan area at a time when forty percent of the African-
Americans in the metropolitan area were living in “substandard or overcrowded units.”118 
¶40 The discriminatory effect of the ordinance became more “onerous” when the court 
assessed it in light of the history of segregated housing.119  The Court of Appeals viewed 
the zoning decision as “but one more factor confining blacks to low-income housing.”120  
                                                 
107 Id. at 1288-89. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. at 1288-90. 
110 See id. at 1288. 
111 United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1181. 
114 See id. at 1186. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (citing United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 810 
(5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
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Thus, the Eighth Circuit case law highlights that affirmative legislative zoning decisions, 
even when facially neutral, must be viewed for their “ultimate effects” on a protected 
class and in light of the “historical context.”121 
4. Compelling the Construction of Public Housing 
¶41 The Third Circuit in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo found that individuals 
eligible for low-income public housing had a successful action against the city of 
Philadelphia and the federal government for terminating construction on the Whitman 
Townhouse project.122  The court established a probative level of judicial review with 
little deference due to facially reasonable acts of the government.123  The plaintiffs sought 
to compel the construction of the Whitman project—a project to be undertaken in a 
predominantly white neighborhood of Philadelphia.124  The court determined that the 
failure to undertake this project had a “greater adverse effect on nonwhite people than on 
white people” based on three factors: (1) the project’s waiting list was ninety-five percent 
minority, (2) the Whitman neighborhood had recently segregated racially, and (3) 
Philadelphia had a history of racial segregation.125 
¶42 The court considered historical context and found that the city, along with local and 
federal housing authorities, helped to transform an integrated neighborhood (in 1960, 
forty-six percent of the families were African-American) to one that was non-integrated 
(by 1970 there were virtually no African-American families in the area).126  The court 
was very concerned with the rise in segregation and was willing to use its equitable 
power to order the city and housing authorities to proceed with construction.127  The court 
concluded that “the Whitman project, when built and tenanted, would restore a measure 
of racial integration to an all-white portion of Whitman,” thus providing an opportunity to 
create an integrated, non-racially-impacted environment.128  The government’s opposition 
to this project had the “undeniable effect of ‘bear[ing] more heavily on one race than 
another.’”129 
¶43 The court was careful to tailor the equitable relief to be no more intrusive than was 
necessary to remedy the specific FHA violation complained of.130  The court of appeals 
overturned the district court’s order that the Philadelphia Housing Authority integrate all 
of Philadelphia’s public housing, because the plaintiffs had not requested that type of 
                                                 
121 Id. (citing United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 810 
(5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
122 564 F.2d 126, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1977). 
123 Id. at 148 (“[T]he test for Title VIII liability, like that of Title VII, ‘involves a more probing judicial 
review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is 
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is 
claimed.’”) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976)). 
124 See id. at 131-32. 
125 Id. at 143-44. 
126 Id. at 149. 
127 See id. at 149-50. 
128 Id. at 143. 
129 Id. (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977)). 
130 See id. at 149. 
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remedy.131  The court did affirm the district court’s order that the Whitman project be 
built, compelling action from the other branches of government.132 
¶44 The Rizzo case illustrates that the termination of a housing project may violate the 
FHA and that the judiciary possesses the equitable power to compel the actual 
construction of a building,133 going beyond the administrative change in zoning law seen 
in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.134  The court in Huntington 
Branch invalidated a municipal ordinance that restricted the development of private 
multifamily housing project––to be inhabited by minorities––to a largely minority urban 
renewal area and forbade the construction in a white neighborhood.135  Under the FHA, a 
district court may compel the executive branch to act, as seen in Rizzo, or make what is 
traditionally a legislative decision, as seen in Huntington Branch.  
5. Rebutting a Prima Facie Case 
¶45 The First Circuit in Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority discussed two 
alternatives for rebutting a prima facie case of housing discrimination.136  The First 
Circuit agreed with the district court that proof of discriminatory effect establishes a 
prima facie case.137  However, the court disagreed with how the district court “balanced” 
the government’s justification for the discrimination against the effect of the 
discrimination.138  The court juxtaposed the Seventh Circuit’s view that a court’s job is to 
balance the magnitude of discriminatory effect against the justification139 with an 
alternative view that relied on a “simple justification test.”140  The First Circuit held the 
government must demonstrate that “the disparate impact in housing [is] justified by a 
legitimate and substantial goal.”141  That court relied on a Supreme Court case142 and 
legislative history143 to show that the government’s preference for local residents was 
substantial and served as proper rebuttal to the showing of a disparate impact.144  It is 
noteworthy that the First Circuit had difficulty applying the HUD regulations requiring 
integrated housing in the rebuttal analysis.145  The court referred to the analysis as 
presenting a “mare’s nest of problems” and only began to untangle the cobweb of HUD 
regulations that require local Public Housing Authorities to act affirmatively in providing 
fair housing.146 
                                                 
131 Id. at 152-53. 
132 Id. at 153. 
133 Id. 
134 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). 
135 See id. at 937-38. 
136 207 F.3d 43, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2000). 
137 Id. at 50. 
138 Id. at 50-51. 
139 Id. at 52 (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 
F.2d 1283, 1290-94 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
140 Id. at 52 (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977) and Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
141 Id. at 52. 
142 Id. at 51 (citing County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 6-7 (1977)). 
143 Id. at 51 n.7 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.208(b) (1996)). 
144 Id. at 52. 
145 Id. at 53. 
146 Id. at 52-53. 
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6. Remedies 
¶46 The Second, Third and Fourth Circuits present the various equitable remedies 
available to plaintiffs who succeed under the FHA.147  The Third Circuit compelled the 
federal and local government to construct public housing and discussed the ability of the 
judiciary to order the desegregation of an entire public housing system.148  The Second 
Circuit altered a zoning ordinance––traditionally a legislative function––to allow for 
private construction of low-income housing.149 
¶47 The Fourth Circuit articulated certain limits on the judicial power, restricting the 
ability to require affirmative action to specific circumstances.150  In Smith v. Town of 
Clarkson, the Fourth Circuit used the Arlington Heights II four-factor analysis to find an 
FHA violation but overturned the district court’s order that required the town to construct 
fifty housing units.151  The court held that requiring the local government to spend local 
revenue was beyond the district court’s power, and that a district court could only order 
the construction to go forward under a “good faith” requirement, leaving open the 
possibility that unnecessary delays or stalling could be remedied by court order.152  The 
court, however, limited this restriction on a district court’s equitable power to the 
circumstances of the case and took care to stress that the local authority only had access 
to local monies, leaving open the possibility of a different result if federal funding was 
involved.153 
¶48 These three circuits illustrate the significant remedial powers that courts possess, 
especially when dealing with a municipality that receives significant federal assistance. 
VI. NEW ORLEANS’ AFRICAN-AMERICAN RESIDENTS CAN FIND PROTECTION UNDER THE 
FHA 
¶49 Hurricane Katrina damaged over a quarter of a million homes154 and the 
participating government entities could decide to rezone, rebuild, buy out, or condemn 
homes or entire neighborhoods.155  This decision would come on the heels of the 
government’s failure to keep its most important promise––to protect its residents.156  The 
Army Corps of Engineers assured city leaders that the levees were strong, which in turn 
led the city to permit building in areas traditionally reserved as wetlands.157  African-
Americans populated the areas that were more vulnerable to flooding.158  Shrinking the 
city’s footprint in order to restore the wetlands is permissible and maybe even advisable, 
                                                 
147 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 151 (3d Cir. 1977); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. 
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1988); Smith v. Clarkson, 682 F.2d 1055, 1067-70 (4th 
Cir. 1972). 
148 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 151. 
149 Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 941-42. 
150 Smith, 682 F.2d at 1067-70. 
151 Id. at 1069. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 1069-70. 
154 A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 11 (2005) (statement of Rep. 
William J. Jefferson). 
155 Russell, supra note 4, at A25. 
156 Warrick & Whoriskey, supra note 2, at A6. 
157 Paul Nussbaum, New Orleans’ Growing Danger, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 8, 2004, at A14. 
158 COLTEN, supra note 63. 
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but that decision must conform to the anti-discriminatory principles of the FHA.  The city 
could approach the shrinking of the footprint in a variety of ways.  This shrinking might 
have an extraordinary impact on African-Americans by changing the city’s racial makeup 
from one that is predominantly African-American to one that is predominantly white.  In 
fact, the city has already begun to redevelop along those lines.159 
¶50 A hypothetical African-American plaintiff who has lost her place in the New 
Orleans footprint will be able to assert that she has suffered a concrete injury, namely the 
loss of her home.  A more difficult question is whether the injury is causally connected to 
government action or more properly attributable to Katrina.  While Katrina may have 
damaged or destroyed a person’s home, it is the government that approved building 
within the city’s footprint.  Furthermore, once the government initiates a recovery plan, it 
is responsible for crafting a plan that complies with the FHA and does not have a 
discriminatory impact.  If the plan affects a resident’s housing options by either altering 
her neighborhood or displacing her from the city’s footprint, then there will be a causal 
connection between that person no longer having a place to live within the New Orleans 
footprint and the specified government action. 
¶51 Focusing on the potential footprint shrinking, the question remains whether the 
FHA is designed to cover the African-American residents excluded from the new 
footprint.  Applying the FHA to the rebuilding of an entire city will exceed the scope of 
any prior FHA case, yet this does not mean that the FHA is inapplicable.  FHA 
jurisprudence forms a mosaic that closely resembles the rebuilding of an entire city.  
Proving an FHA violation will require residents to show a substantial discriminatory 
effect160 and more importantly, to show that the FHA is the proper legal instrument for 
vindicating their rights. 
¶52 The FHA is the proper legal instrument, even with a project as massive as the 
rebuilding of an entire city.  Past FHA cases have focused on discrete programs inside the 
microcosm of a metropolitan area, but when extrapolated, the case law resembles the 
rebuilding of an entire city.  The cases examined thus far all had discriminatory effects, 
but the methods of discrimination were different.  The Third Circuit illustrated that the 
executive department’s termination of a housing project could violate the FHA.161  The 
Second Circuit overturned a decision not to change a zoning law because the failure to 
change the zoning law perpetuated segregation.162  The Eighth Circuit held that a 
legislative decision to change a zoning law, even if facially neutral, cannot have the 
ultimate effect of disparately impacting racial minorities.163  This range of cases covers 
many of the possible government actions that may occur during the rebuilding. 
¶53 An African-American resident of New Orleans displaced from the new footprint 
will be able to satisfy the substantive discriminatory effects test of the FHA and ask a 
court to construct a remedy.  The proper substantive legal inquiries would be whether the 
government’s decision has a greater adverse impact on one racial group over another and 
                                                 
159 Doug Simpson, Evacuees Return for New Orleans Vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2006 (“New 
Orleans had nearly a half-million people, about 70 percent of them black, before Hurricane Katrina. Those 
who have returned number fewer than 200,000, and most are white.”). 
160 Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996). 
161 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 131-33 (3d Cir. 1977). 
162 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938-42 (2d Cir. 1988). 
163 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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what effect the government’s decision has on the required community interest of 
integration (the perpetuation of the segregation issue).164 
¶54 The first inquiry, whether there is a disparate impact, requires the court to examine 
the entire footprint of New Orleans before and after Katrina.  The alternative would be to 
examine the effect a single decision has on a discrete neighborhood.  However, this 
would be improper because (1) the rebuilding decisions are made in concert and not in 
isolation, and (2) courts have traditionally looked outside the four corners of the affected 
area to determine impact.165  Examining how the FHA applies to the rebuilding of an 
entire city may be easiest to understand when the rebuilding is broken into discrete 
projects.  However, to fully understand the specific legal rights of African-American 
residents and to properly remedy their FHA claims, the project must be viewed as 
encompassing the entire New Orleans footprint prior to Katrina.  Prior to Katrina, New 
Orleans had half a million residents and almost seventy percent of them were African-
American.166 
¶55 Only when an individual’s loss of housing is measured against the housing capacity 
for the entire city can the discriminatory effect be properly realized and remedied.  The 
Eighth Circuit’s examination in City of Black Jack represents the proper way to analyze 
an FHA question.167  The Eighth Circuit widened the lens to examine how the decision to 
build housing in the City of Black Jack would affect the African-American population of 
the entire metropolitan area.168  The court found that the ordinance affected eighty-five 
percent of African-Americans living in the metropolitan area, at a time when forty 
percent of the African-Americans in the metropolitan area were living in substandard or 
overcrowded units.169  Similarly, a district court examining the rebuilding decisions being 
made in New Orleans should examine how the decisions affect the African-American 
population of the entire city and not simply one neighborhood.  Looking at the rebuilding 
through that lens will allow the court to properly comprehend whether the shrinking of 
the footprint has a discriminatory effect.  Any new footprint must have racial proportions 
that are similar to those from pre-Katrina New Orleans. 
¶56 Similar circumstances on a smaller scale led to an FHA violation in the Fourth 
Circuit.170  In Betsey v. Turtle Creek Association, the Fourth Circuit found an FHA 
violation when an apartment complex conversion to an all-adult policy had a substantially 
greater adverse impact on minority tenants.171  In making that determination, the court 
looked to how the policy affected the tenants subjected to it and found that the policy 
change would result in over fifty-four percent of African-Americans being evicted as 
opposed to only fourteen percent of whites.172  This type of analysis of a New Orleans 
footprint reduction plan could show similar results.  If the results indicate a radical 
                                                 
164 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, (Arlington Heights II) 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
165 Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186. 
166 U.S. Census Bureau, Orleans Parish QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html 
(last visited May 22, 2007). 
167 508 F.2d at 1186-88. 
168 Id. at 1186. 
169 Id. 
170 Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass’n, 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984). 
171 Id. at 985. 
172 Id. at 989. 
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change in racial percentages with an adverse impact on African-Americans, then the 
same type of violation that occurred in Betsey would be found in New Orleans. 
¶57 Depending on what balancing test is appropriate for rebutting a prima facie case, 
the government will either have to contend that the disparate impact on housing is 
justified by a “legitimate and substantial” goal173 or show that the balance of the 
magnitude of discriminatory effect against the justification is in its favor.174  The 
government could posit that in order to protect the city from a repeat of Katrina, it is 
necessary to scale the footprint back and rely on wetlands as a natural defense.  Thus, the 
shrinking footprint’s disparate impact would be based on science and not on prejudice. 
¶58 However, a reviewing court should follow the lead of the Eighth and Third Circuits 
by looking at the “historical context” when reviewing rebuilding decisions.175  The 
historical context shows two prevailing conditions: first, the city was segregated, and 
second, African-Americans lived in the most dangerous portions of the city.176  By 2000, 
an average African-American resident in New Orleans lived in a neighborhood in which 
eighty-two percent of the population was also African-American (a proportion that is 
considered “highly segregated”).177  Moreover, Louisiana State University Professor 
Craig Colten concluded that the previous design of New Orleans placed racial minorities 
in locations where flooding would have a greater impact.178  This context should color the 
rebuilding decisions in New Orleans in favor of African-Americans since there is an 
unfortunate history of both segregation and circumstances pointing to discriminatory 
intent. 
¶59 As a defense, the government could also assert either that it is not preventing 
African-Americans from using the market to return to the new footprint or that it is 
providing more than adequate compensation in terms of buyout options for the displaced.  
Neither defense would rebut a prima facie FHA case since the issue is not whether 
African-Americans could return, but rather whether they are being displaced.  
Furthermore, the government’s defense would be comparing apples and oranges, as it is 
well known that the housing stock in the predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods is not as valuable as the housing stock in mixed or predominantly white 
neighborhoods.  This disparity in wealth means that, even if African-American 
homeowners are compensated at one hundred percent of pre-Katrina value for their 
property, that income will be substantially less than the value of most property within a 
new footprint. 
                                                 
173 Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2000). 
174 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-94 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
175 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1974); Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). 
176 COLTEN, supra note 63. 
177 NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 6 (citing ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, KATRINA’S 
WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA (Brookings 2005)). 
178 COLTEN, supra note 63 (“With greater means and power, the white population occupied the better-
drained sections of the city, while blacks typically inhabited the swampy ‘rear’ districts.”). 
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VII. REDISTRIBUTING HOUSING STOCK 
¶60 The Rizzo case indicates that the judicial system is willing and able to invalidate 
massive housing projects so long as there is a discriminatory effect in the project’s 
operation.179  Examples of massive remedial plans can be found in the invalidation of 
state-wide educational systems—instances where the state court demands correction of 
the problem but does not mandate a specific performance.180 
¶61 Although New Orleans cannot shrink its footprint in a way that has a 
discriminatory impact, it can shrink its footprint.  The city could either (1) redraw the 
footprint in a way that does not have a discriminatory impact or (2) redistribute the land 
within the footprint to include persons who would otherwise be excluded.  The first 
option requires tactical but feasible line-drawing, but the second will take the raw 
exertion of governmental power and will appear much more controversial. 
¶62 The second option would require the city to use its eminent domain and zoning 
powers simultaneously.  To reduce the footprint fairly, the city would have to condemn 
areas and return them to wetlands while also seizing areas in the new footprint.  The 
seized properties will most likely belong to whites, and the city would have to order their 
redevelopment and resale.  This remedy goes to the heart of obligation.  A person living 
inside the footprint has an obligation, embodied in the FHA, to make sacrifices in order 
for the city to rebuild equitably.  
¶63 The plan may be unpalatable for some and may even be characterized as an 
unconstitutional quota system.181  However, this remedy is not based on granting 
homeownership rights to African-Americans simply because they are African-American. 
Rather, it is based on granting such rights because these African-Americans are former 
residents who are being discriminated against based on their race.  This remedy sounds 
extreme since it will displace two families instead of one, but the racial scars in our 
history, which spawned the FHA, and Professor Colten’s suggestion that African-
Americans were intentionally placed in harm’s way, both lead to the conclusion that 
subjecting one race to greater punishment because of the New Orleans government’s 
failure to provide adequate levee protection would be unfair. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶64 The rebuilding of New Orleans could take many years.  There will be many 
difficult decisions to make before the city is rebuilt.  In addition, there will come a point 
when mainstream America loses interest and political will demanding equality in the 
rebuilding process dissipates.  Physics and topography may dictate that land use 
restrictions need to be implemented to protect future residents and the city itself from a 
repeat of the devastation caused by Katrina.182  However, the city deserves a thoughtful 
and fair rebuilding plan.  New York Times columnist David Brooks pointed out that 
Katrina presents an opportunity to solve some of the social problems that have afflicted 
                                                 
179 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 130. 
180 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET. AL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 827-828 
(rev. 5th ed. 2003); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 883-84 (W. Va. 1979). 
181 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding 
admission policies based on racial quotas unconstitutional). 
182 Gary Rivlin, All Parts of City in Rebuild Plan of New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A18. 
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New Orleans by mimicking a Gautreaux-style183 integrated rebuilding plan.184  Residents 
affected by Katrina––especially those underserved during the recovery effort—need to 
feel confident that the rebuilding plan is centered on principles of inclusion, opportunity, 
and diversity. 
¶65 In the unfortunate instance that the government creates a plan that has a 
disproportionate discriminatory effect, African-American residents will be able to use the 
FHA for protection.  FHA cases taken from around the country demonstrate that although 
the FHA has not been used on such a wide scale before, it certainly can be.  The residents 
do not have a right to housing in New Orleans, but if the city is rebuilt, the housing 
decisions must not, in the aggregate, have a discriminatory effect on African-Americans.  
If the political branches do not protect the interests of former residents, then the federal 
courts must intercede to demand that this be done. 
                                                 
183 See generally Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (federal courts ordered federal and local housing 
authorities to create a metropolitan wide housing integration plan). 
184 David Brooks, Op-Ed., Katrina’s Silver Lining, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A29; see also LEONARD S. 
RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING 
TO WHITE SUBURBIA 1-3 (2000). 
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